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Analysis: China is enthusiastic about Myanmar generals China is enthusiastic about Myanmar generals... | View comments ()

In September, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invited representatives of the Myanmar National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of the detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to participate in a virtual summit of political parties in South and Southeast Asia. This proposal was made shortly after Beijing’s special envoy for Asian affairs, Sun Guoxiang, visited Myanmar in a low-key manner, where he requested a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, but was rejected by the authorities. Sun conducted another unannounced visit this month.

These actions highlight China's desire to maintain reconciliation with the National League for Democracy. Although the National League for Democracy changed to recognize the rule of the military government on February 1, the coalition was expelled from the government by the military on February 1. An editorial in the Global Times, a newspaper owned by the Communist Party of China, in September called the National League for Democracy "legitimate political party in Myanmar." But Beijing saw a delicate line between supporting the National League for Democracy and supporting the Underground National Unity Government (NUG), which tried to overthrow the military government and overturn the status quo before the coup. Although NUG is full of NLD members and former ministers, it seems to China to be an unstable force.

China is now increasingly assuming that the military government will eventually establish effective control over Myanmar, and has therefore moved towards de facto recognition of its authority. In the more than nine months since the coup, Chinese officials have largely normalized contact with the regime, even if they have some doubts about the generals’ ability to govern the country. While maintaining communication with the National League for Democracy, Beijing now seeks to stay out of the deepening crisis and work with the groups in power to advance its interests in Myanmar.

In September, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invited representatives of the Myanmar National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of the detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to participate in a virtual summit of political parties in South and Southeast Asia. This proposal was made shortly after Beijing’s special envoy for Asian affairs, Sun Guoxiang, visited Myanmar in a low-key manner, where he requested a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, but was rejected by the authorities. Sun conducted another unannounced visit this month.

These actions highlight China's desire to maintain reconciliation with the National League for Democracy. Although the National League for Democracy changed to recognize the rule of the military government on February 1, the coalition was expelled from the government by the military on February 1. An editorial in the Global Times, a newspaper owned by the Communist Party of China, in September called the National League for Democracy "legitimate political party in Myanmar." But Beijing saw a delicate line between supporting the National League for Democracy and supporting the Underground National Unity Government (NUG), which tried to overthrow the military government and overturn the status quo before the coup. Although NUG is full of NLD members and former ministers, it seems to China to be an unstable force.

China is now increasingly assuming that the military government will eventually establish effective control over Myanmar, and has therefore moved towards de facto recognition of its authority. In the more than nine months since the coup, Chinese officials have largely normalized contact with the regime, even if they have some doubts about the generals’ ability to govern the country. While maintaining communication with the National League for Democracy, Beijing now seeks to stay out of the deepening crisis and work with the groups in power to advance its interests in Myanmar.

After the coup, China was unwilling to immediately support the military government and its leader Min Aung Lai. But in March, the unclaimed attack on a Chinese factory in the Yangon Industrial Zone marked a major turning point for Beijing and raised concerns about instability. The protests outside the Chinese Embassy in Yangon and the anti-Chinese sentiment after the military takeover did not help them. China calls on the military government to engage in dialogue with those who oppose it, but it refrains from exerting more pressure on the generals on the grounds of non-interference—a stance that has created differences with Japan, South Korea, and the West.

China effectively normalized its relations with the military government in August, when it resumed its work-level business with Myanmar government departments after a long break. According to Jason Ta, the Myanmar National Director of the American Institute of Peace, since then, Chinese ministries and local governments have contacted military officials on health care, regional comprehensive economic partnerships, commerce, and other areas. In the same month, the two sides signed an agreement under which China will transfer US$6.1 million to Myanmar for 21 development projects.

China's involvement in Myanmar has long been high-risk: Beijing has tried to keep its southwestern neighbors within its sphere of influence for decades. Investment through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (part of the Belt and Road Initiative) provides direct access to the Indian Ocean, and Beijing cannot escape the crisis of possible overflow of the border. Since the coup, attacks on Chinese investment, especially the US$2 billion oil and gas pipeline, have caused concern. In late February, Chinese officials asked the military government to strengthen pipeline security.

In addition, China has blocked the border with Myanmar and provided medical equipment and vaccines to the military government known as the armed forces and some ethnic armed groups or EAOs that have fought the government for decades. “The official military government has the full support of China, but unofficially, China is also supporting the northern ethnic armed groups and the (Rakhine State) Rakhine Army in their respective campaigns for greater autonomy,” Ta said. "This also limits the ability of the armed forces to use lethal force in the border areas against the northern EAO."

The Chinese government has been struggling to win over its leaders for months-most notably by speeding up major infrastructure projects, before China slowly recognized the military government. In the fiscal year ending September 30, Myanmar's economy is estimated to have contracted by 18%. As other foreign companies withdraw from the country, Chinese investment can provide the military government with the appearance of legitimacy. "In order to show its legitimacy, the military government is eager for economic recovery," said Wu Qingxiang, a Chinese-Burmese researcher at Xiamen University in China who specializes in Southeast Asia.

Chinese investment can provide the military government with the appearance of legitimacy.

The military government approved a Chinese-funded US$2.5 billion liquefied natural gas power generation project in Mee Lin Gyaing, Ayeyarwady Province in May. This is the only major foreign investment plan approved by the regime so far. It also reorganized the three committees that played an important role in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project and replaced them with personnel appointed by them. These investment projects include economic cooperation zones in Kachin and Shan states and special economic zones in Rakhine State, which are part of the corridor linking Yunnan, China with the cities of Mandalay, Kyaukphyu, and Yangon in Myanmar.

"My understanding is that [military government officials] have been urging China to resume major infrastructure projects that have been stagnant, but China has not shown the willingness to proceed and remain cautious," Wu said.

The regime has expressed its intention to renegotiate proposals for a deep-sea port and special economic zone in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State. In 2018, the National League for Democracy government renegotiated a higher percentage of ownership in Myanmar. But in late July-in the midst of a major COVID-19 wave-the military government started a tender for legal services to advance the project. With the restoration of relations between China and the Myanmar government, the Chinese state-owned conglomerate CITIC Group recently signed an agreement to conduct an on-site investigation of the project.

 At the same time, China has refused to contact NUG, which has been seeking official recognition from foreign governments since its establishment in April and has established unofficial contacts with other countries. NUG disrupted government agencies by supporting civil disobedience movements, forcing companies to cut off ties with military-owned companies, and supporting some anti-coup ethnic armed organizations to challenge the military government. Resistance fighters allied with NUG launched targeted attacks on military personnel and government officials.

Beijing believes that the military government will win - but it's not certain.

Chinese scholars and other experts said that Beijing believed that the military government might be the ultimate winner in Myanmar and therefore decided not to cooperate with NUG. Fan Hongwei, director of the Xiamen Southeast Asian Studies Center, said: "The military has the upper hand, and NUG has no influence, even if the latter is supported by the international community and the people of Myanmar." University. "Even if the Chinese side expresses sympathy for Peking University, it is not convenient for the Chinese side to open close contact with it."

According to NUG cabinet sources, China is one of the few big countries that are completely indifferent to subordinate leaders, and they usually communicate only through a third party. "What surprises us is that China is too stubborn to talk to us," said NUG spokesperson and Minister of International Cooperation Sasza. The official Chinese news agency Xinhua and TV media interviewed military officials, but did not issue an invitation to NUG. "Beijing only talked to the military government is a huge mistake. The military government itself is contributing to instability in the region. Chinese officials know that the Burmese people do not accept Min Aung Lai as their leader," Sassa added.

 Less than ten years ago, Beijing laid the red carpet for the then leader of the opposition party Aung San Suu Kyi-if it loses control, it may abandon the military government. China temporarily placed its bet on the Burmese general, and it may conflict with the international community and resistance movements. The unrest and public backlash undoubtedly increase the risk of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitions in the country. But behind the scenes, China may be preparing for the possibility of another failed state on its borders.

John Liu is a journalist based in Taiwan, focusing on the politics, business and economy of Myanmar. He has written for publications such as Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat, Al Jazeera, and Myanmar Border. Twitter: @JohnLiuNN

Thompson Chau is the former chief reporter and deputy editor of The Myanmar Times based in Yangon. He has written for "The Economist", "Financial Times", "Nikkei Asia" and other institutions. Twitter: @tchau01

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